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 The term ‘bodily awareness’ refers to the feeling of inhabiting a body which is 
separate from other objects in the environment (Bermúdez, 2005). In other words, it is the 
experience of being ‘embodied’ in one’s own body. This phenomenon is essential for 
everyday functioning as, without it, one would be unable to interact with others or the 
environment in a meaningful way. Despite the importance of a stable sense of bodily 
awareness, it is surprisingly easy to manipulate using body illusions. The most well-known 
case is the Rubber Hand Illusion (RHI; Botvinick & Cohen, 1998). In this illusion, a 
participant’s own (occluded) hand is stroked at the same time as a fake hand. The sensory 
conflict caused by the seen and felt touch is resolved by participants feeling as though the 
fake hand is their own hand, as measured by questionnaire responses and a shift in perceived 
location of the participant’s own hand towards the fake hand (proprioceptive drift). However, 
if the stroking on the two hands is asynchronous there is no conflict, and participants do not 
experience ownership of the fake hand. Hence, multisensory synchrony enables adults to 
embody external body-like objects. 
 More recently, researchers have extended the RHI to the Full-Body Illusion (FBI). In 
the same way as in the RHI, participants can embody mannequins or virtual bodies using 
synchronous touch (Ehrsson, 2007; Lenggenhager, Tadi, Metzinger, & Blanke, 2007). 
Importantly for the present study, the FBI can also be induced by synchronous movement of 
the participant’s own body and a virtual body. For example, Peck, Seinfeld, Aglioti, and 
Slater (2013) used full-body motion capture and virtual reality to provide participants with a 
first-person perspective of a body which moved either synchronously or asynchronously with 
their own movements. Participants who experienced the synchronous condition reported 
higher levels of ownership and agency (control) over the virtual body than those who 
experienced the asynchronous condition.  
 Interestingly, it is also possible to evoke embodiment of a body part or full body in 
the absence of any multisensory cues. Rohde, Di Luca, and Ernst (2011) compared 
proprioceptive drift in the classic RHI to a no stroking condition, in which participants 
passively viewed a fake hand with no tactile cues. They found no significant difference in 
drift between synchronous stroking and no stroking conditions after two minutes, though both 
conditions showed significantly higher drift than an asynchronous stroking condition. 
However, it should be noted that the experimenters did not measure self-reported levels of 
embodiment in this study, and so we cannot draw strong conclusions regarding embodiment. 
Carey, Crucianelli, Preston, and Fotopoulou (2019) found that participants reported 
ownership of a mannequin viewed from a first-person perspective to a greater extent in 
conditions with no additional multisensory cues than in conditions which included touch to 
the participant’s own body only. These results demonstrate the strength of viewing a body 
(part) from a first-person perspective, showing that this can be a sufficient cue to embodiment 
without additional multisensory cues. Indeed, in some cases viewing a body from a first-
person perspective can override asynchronous multisensory input, such that participants can 
feel ownership of a virtual body which is touched asynchronously to their own, for example 
(Maselli & Slater, 2013).  
 Though it is widely accepted that adults can embody external bodies under the correct 
multisensory and visual conditions, there is not yet any consensus on the time course of these 
body illusions. In various versions of the RHI, visuotactile/visuomotor stimulation is usually 
delivered for 1-2 minutes. However, there have been very few investigations of the necessary 
delivery duration, and those which do exist vary widely in their results. Kalckert and Ehrsson 
(2017) carried out a visuomotor version of the RHI, in which a fake hand moved either 
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synchronously or asynchronously with the participant’s own hand. In addition to the classic 
questionnaire measures used in the RHI, participants were asked to indicate the time at which 
they began to feel ownership of the fake hand. The average onset time of the illusion was 23 
seconds after synchronous stroking began, with 97% of participants experiencing the illusion 
within 60 seconds. In a visuotactile version of the RHI, Lane, Yeh, Tseng, and Chang (2017) 
found the average illusion onset time was over 100 seconds. In contrast, Lloyd (2007) found 
the average onset of touch referral to the fake hand to be 5 seconds.  
According to Kalckert (2018), these drastic inconsistencies in results are likely due to 
methodological differences between studies. In particular, experimenters measured the onset 
of different aspects of the illusion; ownership (Kalckert & Ehrsson, 2017), touch referral 
(Lloyd, 2007), and the presence of ‘an illusion’ (Lane et al., 2017). Therefore, it may be that 
individual features of the RHI manifest at different points during the illusion. Indeed, as well 
as varying findings regarding onset, researchers have also found the illusion, as measured by 
proprioceptive drift, to increase over time (Tsakiris & Haggard, 2005). In light of these 
variations, measuring the time course of the RHI may not be as straightforward as asking 
participants to indicate its onset. 
 Additionally, although asking participants to freely specify the point at which they 
felt an illusion allows precise onset measurement, it does lend itself to subjective 
interpretation. Indeed, the very act of asking participants to indicate when they begin to feel 
an aspect of the illusion likely biases participants towards expecting the illusion to occur. To 
avoid potential bias when measuring the time course of body illusions, it may be useful to 
manipulate the length of time for which participants experience the illusion-inducing 
situation and compare the strength of different aspects of the illusion across durations (as in 
the present study). Although this method does not allow the experimenter to pinpoint the 
exact moment of illusion onset, it offers a potentially less confounded technique for assessing 
how body illusions develop over time. 
 Though the number of studies which have investigated the onset of the RHI are few, 
to our knowledge there have so far been no investigations of the onset of the FBI. These two 
types of illusion may seem very similar, but they are likely caused by different mechanisms. 
Evidence from the RHI provides valuable information about the embodiment of individual 
body parts, which may be useful in the design of prosthetic limbs, for example. However, it 
has been argued that evidence from the FBI is more informative of the nature of global self-
consciousness, as our very sense of self is situated in our body (Blanke & Metzinger, 2009). 
As such, the FBI could be considered more complex, as it not only influences one’s sense of 
limb ownership, but can also effect implicit beliefs about the self (see for example, Banakou, 
Groten, & Slater, 2013). Additionally, during the FBI participants receive information about a 
whole body, including all four limbs. Assimilating this information may take longer than 
processing simple information from the RHI, potentially increasing its time course. 
Alternatively, the nature of the FBI may make it a faster process than the RHI. Specifically, 
in the virtual FBI, there is a direct overlap between the position of the participant’s own body 
and the position of the virtual body in space, unlike in the traditional RHI where there is an 
offset between the participant’s hand and the fake hand. The lack of conflict between felt and 
seen self-location in this version of the FBI may in fact decrease its time course compared to 
the RHI. In either case, measuring the FBI over time may help us to further understand any 
differences between embodiment of body parts and of full bodies.  
It is also necessary to investigate the course of the FBI over time for practical reasons. 
As the applications of virtual reality widen, from medicine (Levin, Weiss, & Keshner, 2015), 
to therapy (Carl et al., 2019), to reducing implicit social biases (Peck et al., 2013), it is 
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increasingly important to investigate user experiences of virtual bodies. Findings from this 
study will inform procedures for future experiments as well as advising those who design 
applications of virtual reality as to the length of time it may take users to experience presence 
in their virtual environments. 
Here, for the first time, we measured the time course of the FBI. We used virtual 
reality and full-body motion capture to provide participants with a moving virtual body which 
was viewed from a first-person perspective. To allow us to compare the time course of the 
embodiment illusion with a non-illusion control condition, participants experienced 
synchronous, asynchronous, or no movement conditions for durations of either 5 seconds, 30 
seconds, or 55 seconds. They were subsequently asked to rate their feelings of ownership and 
agency over the virtual body. Ownership and agency are two related though separable 
elements of body illusions, which are thought to play a key role in the overall sensation of 
embodiment (Kalckert & Ehrsson, 2012; Kilteni, Groten, & Slater, 2012). We also asked 
participants to rate agreement of two control statements so that we could be confident that 
any effects were specific to embodiment. In addition to examining differences in embodiment 
ratings between conditions, we were interested in identifying conditions which resulted in 
particularly high or low levels of ownership and/or agency (defined as ratings which were 
significantly above or below the midpoint of the questionnaire rating scale).  
 Previous findings suggest that embodiment illusions take time to develop (Kalckert & 
Ehrsson, 2017; Lane et al., 2017; Tsakiris & Haggard, 2005), therefore, we hypothesised that 
embodiment would be low after 5 seconds in all visuomotor synchrony conditions. We 
predicted that embodiment would increase with longer exposure to the body in the 
synchronous and no movement conditions as both have previously shown to induce the FBI 
(Carey et al., 2019; Peck et al., 2013). We predicted that ratings of embodiment would remain 
low for all durations of asynchronous movement.  
 
2. Materials and methods 
2.1. Participants 
Power analyses were carried out using G*Power. Based on a predicted medium effect 
size of f=.5 and a desired power of .8, the total required sample size was calculated to be 30. 
Participants were 34 (25 female) undergraduate students at Durham University, aged 18-39 
years (M=20.8 years, SD=3.7 years). All participants had normal or corrected-to-normal 
vision, and had no motor impairments. All participants gave informed consent to take part in 
the study. The project had ethical approval from Durham Psychology Department Ethics 
Committee. Three participants’ data were excluded due to technical issues with motion 
tracking, leaving 31 participants’ data for analysis. 
 
2.2. Apparatus 
Testing sessions were carried out in a 5m x 9m lab at Durham University Psychology 
Department. The lab is fitted with 16 Vicon Bonita cameras (Vicon, Oxford UK). This 
system uses infrared to track small, reflective markers in real time at 240 Hz, with millimetre 
accuracy. Movement of body parts was tracked using ‘clusters’ of reflective markers attached 
to the arms, legs and trunk using Velcro straps. Participants viewed the virtual environment 
(which was designed to look like a garden tea party) through an Oculus Rift head-mounted 
display (HMD) (Oculus, Menlo Park, CA, USA). The HMD was also fitted with a cluster of 
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reflective markers so that participants’ head movements could be mapped onto movements of 
the virtual head. Virtual bodies were created in MakeHuman (a free modelling software used 
to create 3D human avatars; www.makehumancommunity.org). We used Vicon Pegasus 
software to map the marker clusters on to the corresponding limbs of the virtual body in order 
to match the participant’s posture (Fig 1).  The virtual environment was created and 
implemented using Unity (Unity Technologies, San Francisco, CA, USA).  
 
Figure 1. a) A participant wearing the motion capture clusters and b) the corresponding 
virtual body. 
2.3. Design 
 Visuomotor synchrony (synchronous, asynchronous, no movement) was manipulated 
within-subjects and was counter-balanced to avoid order effects. Piloting had indicated that 
the order of synchrony condition did not affect embodiment ratings (i.e. there was no carry-
over from the synchronous condition to the asynchronous condition). Exposure time had 
three conditions (5s, 30s, 55s) and was manipulated between-subjects. Five seconds was 
chosen as, according to our observations, it is the shortest amount of time that a participant 
could move all four limbs in sequence. Thirty seconds and 55 seconds were chosen so that all 
exposure times were at equal intervals within one minute, within which the vast majority of 
participants experience the moving hand illusion (Kalckert & Ehrsson, 2017). Overall, each 
participant experienced three synchrony conditions for one of three exposure time conditions. 
Eleven participants experienced each synchrony condition for 5s, 10 for 30s, and 10 for 55s. 
Embodiment was measured using self-report. In the virtual environment in which they 
had just experience the virtual body, participants were shown a large blackboard displaying 
one of four statements (shown in Table 1). The four statements were presented in succession. 
Participants indicated their agreement with a statement on a continuous scale, using a marker 
which they could move with their hand. The response scale ranged from ‘NO’ (0% 
agreement) to ‘YES’ (100% agreement). Statements were also simultaneously read aloud by 
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the experimenter. The next statement was presented after the participant had made a 
response. The order of presentation was randomised for each participant.  
 
Table 1. Questionnaire statements and categories. 
 
 2.4. Procedure 
Participants were fitted with reflective motion-tracking markers on their limbs and 
trunk, and a HMD. Their height was measured to the nearest centimetre so that their virtual 
avatar matched their own body size as closely as possible. Before entering the virtual 
environment, participants were taught a series of movements in which they sequentially 
raised and lowered each limb (i.e. left arm raised and lowered, right arm raised and lowered, 
left leg raised and lowered, right leg raised and lowered). A pre-recording of participants 
carrying out these movements these movements lasting roughly 60s was taken, for use in the 
asynchronous visuomotor condition.  
Participants then entered the virtual environment. The environment was an outdoor 
garden party scene, with a mirror located in front of the participant. Therefore, participants 
could see a gender-matched virtual body from both a first-person perspective and in the 
mirror reflection. In both the synchronous and asynchronous visuomotor conditions, 
participants were asked to perform the same movements they were taught at the beginning of 
the experiment. Tracking was done by the highly accurate Vicon Tracker motion capture 
system operating at 240 Hz, and movement was mapped to the avatar’s movements via gold 
standard Vicon Pegasus software. In the synchronous condition, therefore, the virtual body’s 
movements were driven by the participant’s live movements with no perceivable lag. In the 
asynchronous condition, the pre-recording of the participant’s earlier movements drove the 
avatar’s movements so that the participant had no control over the movements of the avatar. 
Indeed, to ensure that there was no question that  the movements in this condition were seen 
as being driven by the participant’s current actions, the recording was played from halfway 
through so that, as the participant moved their arms, they could usually see the avatar moving 
its legs (although, again, there was no causal relationship between the two). In the no 
movement condition, participants were asked to stand still with their arms slightly extended 
in front of them, and to look towards the floor so that they had a partial view of the body 
from a first-person perspective and in the mirror. Although participants were asked to stand 
as still as possible, any tiny movements they made were still reflected in the avatar. Once 
they had experienced the scene for their specified exposure time (5s, 30s, or 55s) they 
completed the embodiment questionnaire detailed in section 2.3. and then the experiment 
automatically moved on to the next visuomotor condition (for the same exposure time). This 
procedure was repeated three times so every subject experienced each visuomotor synchrony 
condition. Participants were then debriefed and awarded course credits for their participation. 
The full procedure took roughly 30 minutes per participant. 
Statement Category 
At the tea party, I felt as if the virtual body I saw was my own body or 
belonged to me. 
Embodiment 
(Ownership) 




At the tea party, I felt like I had a tail. Control 





 We carried out all analyses using IBM SPSS 22 or JASP. Bayes factor (BF10) 
is reported for all parametric tests, indicating the likelihood of H1 compared to H0. In 
accordance with Kass and Raftery (1995), BF10 of 3.2 or lower is considered extremely weak 
evidence against H0, whilst BF10 of 10 or above is considered strong evidence against H0.  
Firstly, for the purpose of this study we wished to be able to distinguish conditions in 
which ratings indicated ‘high’ or ‘low’ levels of embodiment as opposed to those with 
middling embodiment levels. We operationalised ‘high’ and ‘low’ ratings as those which 
were significantly higher or lower than 50% respectively, as tested by one-sample t-test (it is 
worth noting that this method of categorisation is rather conservative, as arguably any rating 
above zero indicates some level of embodiment). Mean ratings which significantly differed 
from 50% are indicated in Table 2. Notably, ownership ratings were consistently middling –  
never significantly higher or lower than 50% after synchronous (5s: t(10)=1.20, p=.258, 
BF10=.534; 30s: t(9)=1.44, p=.183, BF10=.693; 55s: t(9)=1.77, p=.111, BF10=.979) or no 
movement (5s: t(10)=1.40, p=.191, BF10=.648; 30s: t(9)=.32, p=.760, BF10=.322; 55s: 
t(9)=1.57, p=.151, BF10=.789) conditions. Agency ratings were always significantly higher 
than 50% after synchronous (5s: t(10)=11.26, p=<.001, BF10=28253.927; 30s: t(9)=14.47, 
p=<.001, BF10=79283.742; 55s: t(9)=17.88, p=<.001, BF10=404120.494)  and no movement 
(5s: t(10)=7.47, p=<.001, BF10=1093.041; 30s: t(9)=7.06, p=<.001, BF10=448.6; 55s: 
t(9)=7.59, p=<.001, BF10=726.289) conditions. After 5s exposure to asynchronous 
movement, neither ownership (t(10)=-.26, p=.801, BF10=.648) nor agency (t(10)=1.0, p=.343, 
BF10=.448) ratings were significantly different to 50%. These scores were significantly lower 
than 50% after 30s (ownership: t(9)=-2.37, p=.042, BF10=2.016; agency: t(9)=-4.06, p=.003, 
BF10=17.262) and 55s (ownership: t(9)=-3.73, p=.005, BF10=11.421; agency: t(9)=-7.04, 
p<.001, BF10=441.305) of asynchronous movement. 
We then investigated the effects of exposure time and visuomotor synchrony on 
embodiment using a mixed ANOVA with between-subjects factor: exposure time (5s, 30s, 
55s), and within-subjects factors: synchrony (synchronous, asynchronous, no movement), and 
statement (ownership, agency, hair, tail). Statement was included as a factor to assess any 
differences between ownership and agency between conditions. Interactions were examined 
by carrying out follow-up ANOVAs. For any analyses in which the assumption of sphericity 
was violated, a Greenhouse-Geisser correction was applied to the corresponding F-test. We 
conducted additional analysis of our data to check for further deviations from the 
assumptions of ANOVA. The residuals could be considered borderline in terms of normality. 
This is unlikely to have affected the conclusions we drew from the analyses (Keppel, 1991). 
Nevertheless, we ran complementary non-parametric tests, which returned results entirely 
consistent with the findings of our initial parametric analyses. Means and standard deviations 








Table 2. Means and standard deviations for each condition. + indicates values significantly 
higher than 50%. – indicated values significantly lower than 50%. 
  
The four statements were rated significantly differently (F(1.61,45.03)=123.43, 
p<.001, ηp
2=.815, BF10=3.876e+61). Mean ratings of the two control statements were not 
significantly different from each other (p=1.0, BF10=.141), but were significantly lower than 
mean ratings of both embodiment statements (Hair lower than Ownership: p<.001, 
BF10=1.753e+16, and Agency: p<.001, BF10=1.062e+25; Tail lower than Ownership: p<.001, 
BF10=2.739e+18, and Agency: p<.001, BF10=5.421e+25). Overall the mean agency rating 
was significantly higher than the mean ownership rating (p<.001, BF10=173946.167).  
Figure 2. Mean ratings of control (a and b), ownership (c), and agency (d) statements for 









  M SD M SD M SD M SD 
5s Sync 59.6 26.6 89.9+ 11.8 10.9- 24.9 11.5- 23.1 
Async 47.6 30.3 59.5 31.8 10.0- 21.5 11.9- 28.3 
No movement 62.3 29.0 80.7+ 13.6 14.4- 29.5 7.9- 18.5 
Overall 56.5 28.5 76.7 24.2 11.8- 24.8 10.5- 23.0 
30s Sync 64.8 32.4 94.9+ 9.8 2.5- 7.9 0.0- 0.0 
Async 31.1- 25.2 19.2- 24.0 0.6- 1.1 2.5- 5.3 
No movement 53.0 30.1 84.2+ 15.3 11.1- 31.3 0.0- 0.0 
Overall 49.6 31.7 66.1 37.9 4.7- 18.6 0.8- 3.2 
55s Sync 64.6 26.1 95.0+ 8.0 3.9- 8.8 2.9- 5.1 
Async 19.9- 25.5 19.7- 13.6 5.4- 9.5 6.8- 21.5 
No movement 62.8 25.8 84.2+ 14.3 6.2- 13.1 10.6- 26.2 
Overall 49.1 32.6 66.3 35.8 5.2- 10.3 6.8- 19.4 
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 Synchrony significantly affected ratings (F(1.63,45.68)=72.01, p<.001, ηp
2=.720, 
BF10=8784.677). While there was no significant difference between the synchronous and no 
movement conditions (p=.774, BF10=.178), the mean rating in the asynchronous condition 
was significantly lower than both (Synchronous: p<.001, BF10=8.564e+7; No Movement: 
p<.001, BF10=1.466e+7). The significant two-way interaction of statement and synchrony 
(F(4.14,115.87)=33.50, p<.001, ηp
2=.545, BF10=6.921e+89) showed that this pattern of lower 
ratings in the asynchronous condition was found for the two embodiment statements only 
(Ownership: F(2,92)=10.27, p<.001, η2=.186, BF10=120237.733; Agency: F(2,92)=75.77, 
p<.001, η2=.627, BF10=8.769e+17), but not the two control statements (Hair: F(2,92)=.70, 
p=.502, η2=.015, BF10=.297; Tail: F(2,92)=.11, p=.892, η
2=.003, BF10=.147). 
Exposure time did not produce a main effect (F(1,28)=2.17, p=.133, ηp
2=.134, 
BF10=.125), but there was a significant three-way interaction between synchrony, statement, 
and exposure time. Statement and exposure time did not interact in either the synchronous 
(F(3.56,49.86)=.73, p=.623, ηp
2=.050, BF10=.019) or no movement conditions 
(F(4.03,56.43)=.39, p=.816, ηp
2=.027, BF10=.011), but rather in the asynchronous condition 
(F(3.71,51.92)=2.68, p=.045, ηp
2=.161, BF10=1.674e+8). Here, there was no effect of 
exposure time for either control statement (Hair: F(2,30)=1.20, p=.318, η2=.079, BF10=.449; 
Tail: F(2,30)=.53, p=.597, η2=.036, BF10=.293; Figs 2a-b), and only a weak trend for the 
ownership statement (F(2,30)=2.77, p=.080, η2=.165, BF10=1.189; Fig 2c). However, there 
was a significant effect of exposure time on mean agency ratings in the asynchronous 
condition (F(2,30)=9.41, p=.001, η2=.402, BF10=45.477; Fig 2d), where ratings were higher 
in the 5s condition than in the 30s (p=.002, BF10=9.902) or 55s (p=.003, BF10=20.136) 
conditions.  
We then carried out Kruskal Wallis tests to further examine the effect of exposure 
time on ownership and agency ratings for each synchrony condition. Due to the lack of clear 
guidelines for calculation Bayes factors from non-parametric tests, we cannot report Bayes 
factors here. These analyses confirmed that ratings did not differ with exposure time in either 
the synchronous (ownership: H(2)=.41, p=.815; agency: H(2)=1.28, p=.528) or no movement 
conditions (ownership: H(2)=.91, p=.634; agency: H(2)=.42, p=.812). In the asynchronous 
condition, ownership ratings showed a weak trend towards decreasing with increased 
exposure time (H(2)=5.40, p=.067). Agency ratings showed a highly significant decrease 
with increased exposure time (H(2)=10.13, p=.006). 
In summary, we found that feelings of agency of a virtual body were rated highly after 
both synchronous and no movement conditions regardless of exposure time. After 
asynchronous movement, participants rated their feelings of agency of the body as middling 
after 5 seconds, but these ratings decreased significantly with increased exposure to the 
asynchronously-moving body. This pattern could be seen to a lesser extent for ownership 
ratings, which were also lower than agency ratings overall. Possible reasons for this 
difference between the two embodiment ratings are discussed in the following section. 
 
4. Discussion 
 In the present study, we investigated the role of visuomotor synchrony on 
embodiment over time. We compared the time course of the full-body illusion (FBI) when 
participants were presented with a virtual body which moved synchronously or 
asynchronously with their own movements, or did not move at all. With regards to 
visuomotor synchrony, we replicated previous findings that synchronous and no movement 
induce embodiment to a greater extent than asynchronous movement (Carey et al., 2019; 
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Kokkinara & Slater, 2014; Peck et al., 2013). It could be argued that embodiment ratings 
were high in the ‘no movement’ condition as participants may have experienced some 
visuomotor synchrony. Despite being instructed to remain as still as possible, any small 
movements made by participants would have been reflected in the movements of the virtual 
body. Though any such movements would be much smaller than those made in the 
synchronous condition, it is possible that they could have induced a similar sense of agency 
and ownership of the virtual body. However, such movements were seldom observed by the 
experimenters. Plus, even in the presence of small movements in the no movement condition, 
the extent of body movement still differed greatly between synchronous and no movement 
conditions. Therefore it is still notable that participants rated their feelings of embodiment  
similarly in these conditions, despite the differing movement experiences. Additionally, as 
our results replicate previous findings from ‘pure’ no movement conditions (Carey et al., 
2019), we can be reasonably confident in our interpretation. Despite this, future work should 
aim to eliminate the possibility of small amounts of synchronous movements, perhaps by 
freezing the view of the body which the participant views through the HMD. 
Interestingly, even in the synchronous condition, ownership ratings were not 
particularly high (around 60%), in comparison to agency ratings (around 90%). This may be 
the result of participants reporting their believed – i.e. cognitively mediated – levels of 
ownership, as opposed to their felt levels. Previous findings suggest that participants rate 
their feelings of ownership of a fake hand as higher than their believed ownership, as adults 
of course consciously know that a fake hand does not belong to them (Tamè, Linkenauger, & 
Longo, 2018). Though the questionnaire statements in the present study were worded to 
relate to participants’ feelings, future studies may wish to give more explicit instructions to 
participants regarding such rating scales. Alternatively, it may be the case that participant’s 
ratings did reflect their felt levels of ownership of the virtual body, which were in fact not as 
high as their felt agency. One possible reason for these relatively low ownership ratings is 
that participants could see the virtual body’s face in the mirror in front of them. As, in most 
cases, the virtual face did not resemble the participant’s own face any further than being 
gender-matched, and did not move with participants’ changes in expression etc., the presence 
of the visible face may have negatively affected participants’ feelings of ownership. Certain 
previous studies in which participants view a virtual face in a mirror also show middling 
ownership ratings (Banakou et al., 2013; Slater, Spanlang, Sanchez-Vives, & Blanke, 2010). 
There may be reason, therefore, to further investigate whether viewing the face of a virtual 
body can reduce feelings of ownership over it. 
Contrary to our predictions, we also found that participants experienced middling-to-
high levels of agency over the avatar after 5 seconds regardless of visuomotor synchrony. 
Agency ratings remained high with increased exposure to the body (30 second and 55 
seconds) in the synchronous and no movement conditions, but decreased dramatically in the 
asynchronous condition. There was weaker evidence of this pattern for ownership ratings, 
where it did not reach significance. This may be due to the overall lower ratings given for the 
ownership statement, which have already been discussed. Overall, these findings directly 
oppose our hypotheses. Based on previous findings, we had predicted that embodiment would 
be low after a short exposure to a virtual body, and would increase in the synchronous and no 
movement conditions. 
 Particularly striking is our finding that reported agency was middling-to-high after 5 
seconds of exposure to the virtual body, regardless of visuomotor synchrony. For the most 
part, this is in contrast to previous work. Lloyd (2007) did suggest that participants 
experienced touch referral on a rubber hand after 5 seconds of synchronous stroking, however 
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they did not compare this to an asynchronous stroking condition. Additionally, though touch 
referral is one key aspect of the Rubber Hand Illusion (RHI), its onset cannot necessarily be 
generalised to the onset of illusory ownership or agency. When Kalckert and Ehrsson (2017) 
asked participants to indicate the onset of ownership of a rubber hand, they found the average 
onset to be after 23 seconds of synchronous movement. Again, this was not compared to an 
asynchronous movement condition. Of course, the methods used in previous studies differed 
to the ones that we employed. Whilst other researchers asked participants to indicate the 
exact point at which they began to feel part of the illusion, we asked participants to rate 
embodiment levels on a 0-100 scale after pre-determined ‘doses’ of visuomotor experience. 
Measuring the onset of an illusion is an ‘all or nothing’ method, as participants must decide 
between not feeling the illusion at all and feeling it entirely. Allowing participants to rate 
their experience on a scale may have allowed us to pick up on evidence of embodiment 
earlier than in previous studies. Future work could confirm whether this is the case by asking 
participants to identify the onset of the FBI as in previous work on the onset of the RHI. It 
may be that this method would produce findings comparable to previous work. Alternatively, 
there may be something specific about full bodies which elicits embodiment more quickly 
than body parts. 
Indeed, whilst all previous work to our knowledge has focused on the onset of the 
Rubber Hand Illusion (RHI), we were particularly interested in the time course of the FBI. It 
is plausible that the embodiment of a single body part may follow a different time course than 
the embodiment of a full body. Previous studies in which participants were asked to indicate 
the onset of the illusion work under the assumption that body illusions start from zero and 
build to feelings of embodiment with additional information. That is, the default state of 
participants is to not embody an external object until the evidence builds to suggest that it 
should be embodied. This may be true in the case of individual body parts, at least for 
subjective ratings of their embodiment. The contrary has been suggested regarding 
proprioceptive drift, where it seems that synchronous stroking does not enhance the drift, but 
rather that extended asynchronous stroking reduces it (Rohde et al., 2011; see also Makin, 
Holmes, & Ehrsson, 2008). However, our results lend support to the idea that at least some 
level of embodiment may be the default for full bodies, which can be broken by 
asynchronous movement.  
Blanke and Metzinger (2009) refer to the idea of ‘minimal phenomenal selfhood’ 
(MPS), which is made up of the minimum conditions necessary to experience a global self-
consciousness or sense of self. In this view, embodiment of a full body may be different to 
that of a single limb not just in terms of size, but in its philosophical implications for our 
sense of self. For example, embodying virtual avatars of different races reduces participants’ 
implicit racial bias (Farmer, Tajadura-Jiménez, & Tsakiris, 2012; Peck et al., 2013), and 
embodying a virtual child body led participants to self-identify with child-like attributes more 
quickly (Banakou et al., 2013).  Therefore, MPS is a different and more global phenomenon 
to embodying individual body parts. Blanke and Metzinger argue that a visual first-person 
perspective, self-localisation, and self-identification are necessary for a sense of MPS, all of 
which were available to participants in the present study in even the shortest exposure time 
under asynchronous visuomotor conditions. Indeed, holding a first-person perspective of a 
body is a unique experience reserved only for one’s own body under normal circumstances, 
making it a particularly salient cue to body ownership (de Vignemont, 2018). This may 
explain why participants can embody a virtual body seen from this perspective, even in the 
presence of some asynchronous multisensory feedback (Maselli & Slater, 2013). Due to the 
presence of this factor, MPS may have been instantly induced in this study. 
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Interestingly, agency is not thought to be a necessary condition for MPS, as a sense of 
agency involves consciously directing attention towards the body whilst MPS is 
subconscious.  When the body is the object of direct attention, MPS develops into what 
Blanke and Metzinger refer to as a “strong first-person perspective”, or a more conscious 
form of bodily awareness. We argue that in the 5-second exposure time condition, 
participants experienced some level of MPS in all visuomotor synchrony conditions. Their 
whole-body movements may have activated a global motor representation which were not 
affected by local visuomotor synchrony. In other words, “I feel myself making full body 
movements, and see a body making full body movements. Therefore, I am controlling the 
movements of the body I see”. Though local aspects of motor representations would have 
been mismatched, 5 seconds may not have been a sufficient amount of time to detect this and 
draw explicit attention to it. However, after 30 seconds and longer, participants may have 
developed a strong first-person perspective of the virtual body, wherein they consciously 
attended to the local aspects of the virtual body’s movements, as well as the global aspects. 
This may explain why, in conditions longer than 5 seconds, participants’ embodiment 
(particularly agency) ratings of the asynchronously moving virtual body decreased 
significantly. 
A potential limitation of the present study, is that we did not control for the frequency 
of body movements during the different exposure times. Therefore, as the length of time 
spent in the virtual body increased, so did the number of limb movements made by 
participants. From this, we cannot definitively separate the effect of exposure duration from 
the effect of number of limb movements on perceived embodiment. Future investigations of 
the time course of the FBI may wish to control for these factors in order to pinpoint the exact 
factors which influence changes in embodiment over time. Related to this point, in this study 
we did not record tracking data of participants’ movements across synchrony conditions. 
Therefore it is impossible to know whether participants moved differently in terms of speed, 
for example, between synchronous and asynchronous movement conditions. If participants 
did indeed move more slowly in the asynchronous condition, it could be argued that this 
reduced movement drove the effect of synchrony on embodiment ratings. In future it may be 
useful to record tracking data of participants’ movements during the experiment. 
The findings of this study have provided valuable insight into MPS and provided 
evidence in support of the idea that this global self-consciousness may differ from local 
embodiment of individual body parts. In particular, full-body illusions may induce MPS 
immediately, whereas single body part illusions may take more time to develop. Our findings 
could also have practical applications in virtual reality and particularly virtual body design. 
We have shown that adult participants are able to embody a virtual avatar seen from a first-
person perspective despite experiencing short doses of asynchronous movement. Therefore, 
in virtual body exposure lasting only a few seconds, avatar movements may not have to be 
completely in synchrony with the user’s movements. Arguably, this first-person perspective 
may be a key factor in embodiment such that users could embody forms other than human as 
long as there is a first-person perspective. Future work should aim to identify the limits of the 
power of first-person perspective in embodiment of virtual bodies. 
 
5. Conclusions 
 In this study, we aimed to understand the time course of the Full Body Illusion. We 
found that participants rated ownership and agency of a virtual body as middling-to-high after 
5 seconds of exposure, regardless of visuomotor synchrony. Visuomotor synchrony affected 
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embodiment ratings differently over time. In particular, agency ratings remained high after 30 
and 55s of synchronous or no movement, but decreased after the same duration of 
asynchronous movement. We take this to show that minimal phenomenal selfhood can be 
immediately induced when viewing a full body from a first-person perspective, even when 
that body is moving asynchronously to one’s own. Further deliberate attention towards the 
body for longer durations may then lead to embodiment in synchronous/no movement 
conditions alone. These results have both theoretical implications and practical applications 
in virtual reality design and user experience. 
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